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ABSTRACT
CUSTOMER’S INVENTORY ACCRUALS AND SUPPLIER’S EARNINGS
QUALITY
by
Fok Cheuk Kwong
Master of Philosophy

We examine the influence of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s accounting
quality and earnings management practices. We consider two views of the role of
customer’s inventory accruals play on their supplier and how they relate to their
financial reporting. The first is the customer’s inventory accruals reflect supplier’s
earnings management (i.e., intentional bias) as well as lead to difficulty in supplier’s
earnings estimation (i.e., unintentional errors). The second view is based on supplier’s
information advantage theory, which suggests suppliers are capable to interpret the
information content of customer’s inventory accruals. In contrast to the information
advantage view, we find that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory
accruals have lower earnings quality and engage in more earnings management, even
after controlling for their own inventory accruals level.
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1. Introduction
“Thomas and Zhang (2002) … find that inventory accruals exhibit the most robust
relation with future stock returns … it is likely due to both the economic magnitude of
inventory accruals and the reluctance of managers to write down inventory in the face of
slowing demand.”
(Dechow et al. 2011)
We investigate the influence of the economic magnitude of customer’s inventory
accruals on supplier’s earnings quality. An instrumental paper of Sloan (1996) show that
the quality of the accrual component of earnings is lower than that of cash flow component.
Further, Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that change in inventory is the most important
component of accrual estimation error. Recently, Allen et al. (2013) indicate that inventory
accruals lead to lower earnings quality due to measurement error caused by the writedowns of inventory. Although inventory accrual is an important determinant of earnings
quality, it is unclear that whether inventory accruals of one firm exhibit externalities and
affect the earnings quality of their economically-related counterparties, i.e. suppliers.
Meanwhile, Operations Management literature document that customer’s excess
inventory news is associated with negative short windows stock returns of their suppliers
(Hendricks and Singhal 2009). Accordingly, inventory management and its impacts along
the supply chain are focused by the industry participants. For example, Home Depot Inc.
draws media attention by adopting lean inventory management (Ziobro, 2016) and
Walmart are blamed by attaining better inventory management through passing the costs
on to their suppliers (Nuzio, 2019). Recent works in accounting demonstrate the role of
customers/suppliers on a firm’s accounting practices (Raman and Shahrur 2008, Hui et al.
1

2012). We extend this stream of studies by testing how, if at all, inventory accruals which
reside in the downstream customers influence the supplier’s accounting quality and
earnings management behavior.
We consider two views of the influence of customer’s inventory accruals on the
supplier’s earnings quality. The first view is based on the notion that inventory buildup at
downstream customer reflects both intentional and unintentional estimation errors. An
increase in customer’s inventory accruals is a signal that supplier is engaged in real
earnings management through channel stuffing. To elaborate, suppliers may inflate their
earnings/sales by loading excessive inventory to its customers than they are capable of
selling. However, customers will return unsold inventory in the future and associated
revenues of suppliers will not be realized. The inflated earnings achieved by real earnings
management will probably reverse in the future, lead to lower persistence of earnings and
poor accounting quality. Second, customer’s inventory accruals cause unintentional errors
in earnings estimation since it is more difficult for supplier to predict an uncertain future,
or just because measurement error related to the inventory write-downs. Prior research in
operation management (e.g. Steinker and Hoberg 2013) suggest that inventory level
signals either expected higher future demand or sales fall below expectations. Moreover,
the demand uncertainty propagates to upstream suppliers in an amplified form by the
bullwhip effect (Bray and Mendelson 2012). For example, when supplier (the announcing
firm) announces the excess inventory news about its customers, the negative market
reaction is more serious than when the excess inventory is about the announcing firm
directly (Hendricks and Singhal 2009). The demand uncertainty coupled with the bullwhip
effect may raise difficulty for supplier firms to estimate earnings and provide high quality
financial statements.
2

An alternative view suggests that suppliers, especially those who operate in closely
related lines of business of their customers, are capable to access to customer’s superior
information and promote a more accurate estimation in future prospects and earnings. This
view is predicated on the supplier extending trade credits to their customers and its
information advantage beyond financial intermediaries can reduce information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (information advantage hypothesis). Petersen
and Rajan (1997) document that suppliers extend trade credit to even loss-making
customers when suppliers predict these customers have high growth potential in the future.
Intuitively, suppliers gather private information from customers during the ordinary
course of business and they are able to differentiate different business conditions signaled
by customer’s inventory accruals. In other words, customer’s inventory accruals and
supplier’s private information pieced together as “mosaic” and provide additional
information for suppliers to estimate earnings. Thus, we attempt to answer the empirical
question if customer’s inventory accruals level affect supplier’s earnings quality.
Following prior literature (e.g. Thomas and Zhang 2002, Allen et al. 2013), we employ
changes in inventory over average total assets as the measure of inventory accruals. Our
final sample includes 7,950 firms in Compustat Segment database. To address potential
problems related to omitted variables, we control for supplier’s own inventory accruals
level.
We examine the impact of customer’s inventory accruals using two measures of
earnings quality and a measure of financial misstatement. In each case, we control for
related determinants of earnings quality identified in the prior literature. Our findings are
consistent with customer’s inventory accruals exerting a significant negative influence on
supplier firms' earnings management and earnings quality, instead of a positive causal
3

relation. In particular, we find that higher level of customer’s inventory accruals leads to
poorer supplier’s earnings quality measured by the standard deviation of residuals derived
from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and the absolute magnitude of discretionary
accruals. Moreover, we show that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory
accruals exhibit a higher tendency of a financial misstatement as measured by “fraud score”
(Fscore) (Dechow et al., 2011). Thus, we conclude that customer’s inventory accruals
level is a significantly negative determinant of supplier’s earnings quality.
We employ numerous additional analyses to evaluate the robustness of the main
results. First, we use the change specification to examine how the change in customer’s
inventory accruals affect the change in supplier’s earnings quality. Second, we use an
instrumental variables analysis to address potential endogeneity concern. Third, we
followed Roychowdhury (2006) to add the change in LIFO reserve to inventory accruals
as an alternative measure to account for the differences caused by first-in, first-out (FIFO)
versus last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory valuation methods. Taken as a whole, the results
continue to cast doubt on the supplier’s informational advantage and favor the difficulty
in earnings estimation view. In no case do we find higher customer’s inventory accruals
level cause higher supplier’s accounting quality or less likelihood of a financial
misstatement.
Our paper adds to the contemporary accounting literature in numerous directions. First,
this study highlights that high level of customer’s inventory accruals harms supplier firms’
financial reporting quality. Although some studies try to investigate the causal relation
between the role of inventory accruals and earnings quality, they focus on how inventory
accruals affect the earnings quality of their own firms instead of its externalities on
suppliers. To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate if the inventory accruals of one
4

firm affect the earnings quality of their economically-related counterparties. Second, by
providing strong and consistent evidences on the causal relatioship between customer’s
inventory accruals and supplier’s financial reporting quality, we shed light on how
customer’s inventory accruals extend to other aspects to stock market reaction, in this case,
financial reporting quality. Third, our findings have important implications to the capital
market participants. If customer’s inventory accruals level affects supplier firms’ earnings
quality, our findings are useful to accountants, auditors, investors as well as regulators in
distinguishing reliable earnings information from less accurate information. Thus, our
findings can help capital market participants better understand how firms’ business and
reporting behaviors are affected by accounting information of their downstream customers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the literature reviews and hypotheses
development. Section 3 outlines the research designs and section 4 describes the sample.
In section 5 we discuss the empirical findings. Section 6 demonstrates additional analyses
and section 7 offers the conclusion.

2. Hypotheses Development and Related Research
An instrumental paper of Sloan (1996) break down earnings into two components:
cash flows and total accruals, and the literature has developed to further test the persistence
of the components of cash flows and different accruals. For inventory accruals,
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) document that firms with low inventory accruals quality
have more future changes in earnings. In addition, Thomas and Zhang (2002) show that
the inventory change is the most important cause of accrual anomaly. Allen et al. (2013)
show that inventory accruals are likely to experience subsequent reversals because of
5

inventory write-downs, which reflect that higher inventory accruals lead to lower
persistence of earnings.
Recent literature in operations management indicate that the buildup of excess
inventory adversely affects firm outcomes in financial performance and stock market
reaction. For instance, Chen et al. (2005, 2007) and Steinker and Hoberg (2013) establish
a negative relationship between high inventory level and future stock returns. Likewise,
Kesavan and Mani (2013) document abnormal inventory growth is associated with poor
one-year ahead earnings.
Researchers have recently taken an interest in exploring the influence of customer’s
corporate behavior on their suppliers. Hendricks and Singhal (2009) show the negative
impacts of customer’s excess inventory announcement on supplier firm’s stock returns in
short time windows of one to five days after the announcement. Their paper underscores
the financial implications of customer’s inventory information to their economicallyrelated counterparties. Hertzel et al. (2008) document that when customers files for
bankruptcy, the stock returns of their suppliers are likely to be negative, and Houston, Lin
and Zhu (2016) demonstrate that a customer’s bankruptcy increases the bank financing
costs of its major suppliers. Hui et al. (2012) show that when the bargaining power of
customer is stronger, the supplier meets the demand for accounting conservatism
recognizes losses more quickly, and vice versa. Overall, prior empirical evidence suggests
that customer’s corporate behaviors are important actors on supplier’s financial practices,
as well as accounting policies.
However, there is no empirical evidence on whether the impacts of customer’s
inventory accruals exert on their supplier firms’ earnings quality and likelihood of
earnings misstatement. Prior studies on earnings quality are basically related to accruals
6

quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004). There are two reasons for poor accruals quality. First,
managers can intentionally manipulate accruals through earnings management. Second,
managers can unintentionally misestimate accruals because it is hard to predict the future
or because there are demand shocks due to customer’s inventory write-downs. Both
reasons have been well studied in the existing literature. From the perspective of earnings
management, prior studies have documented that managers use “inventory accruals” to
overstate their earnings (e.g., Thomas and Zhang 2002). For unintentional errors, Dechow
and Dichev (2002) show that the accruals quality is not only associated with managerial
opportunism but also systematically related to the volatility of operations, such as absolute
size of accruals, loss incidence, and the standard deviation of cash flows, accruals,
earnings, and sales.
We expect that a high level of customer’s inventory accruals leads to poor supplier’s
earnings quality because errors in accrual estimation are likely to occur and affect the
financial reporting quality. These potential errors can be caused by intentional errors, such
as earnings management, and unintentional errors such as measurement errors. For
intentional errors, inventory buildups at customers could imply that supplier firms may
engage in “channel stuffing” or “trade loading,” which could lead to earnings
management through accelerating revenue recognition and recording receivables sooner
than justified. For unintentional errors, a higher level of customer’s inventory accruals
indicates greater uncertainty, more estimation and result in estimation errors, and thus
lower earnings quality. In the face of confounding signals due to customer’s inventory
growth, suppliers have inherent difficulty to distinguish between expected future demand
increases or bloated inventories due to disappointing sales, which increase the uncertainty
about the future demand and volatility of operations. In case of bloated inventories,
7

supplier firms have less control over magnitude and the speed of inventory reductions.
The suppliers’ future business prospects are likely related to the actions of customers take,
such as promotion and sales discount. Such kind of high uncertainty in the operating
environment increases the tendency of using approximations and estimation, and result in
higher estimation errors and lower accrual quality. In particular, Allen et al. (2013) show
that firms with high inventory accruals are more likely to report write-downs of inventory
in next years. As customer’s inventory write-downs are severe negative shocks to the
supplier firm's future sales and cash flows, supplier firms are suffered from less stable
predictable future prospects, therefore, more and larger estimation errors. Hence, if
customer’s inventory accruals levels allow intentional and unintentional errors in earnings
estimation to occur, we expect a negative causal relation between customer’s inventory
accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality.
Although higher level of customer’s inventory accruals might lead to higher
supplier’s earnings estimation error, supplier’s information advantage could potentially
suggest customer’s inventory accruals do not affect supplier’s earnings quality.
It is generally accepted that the supplier’s information advantage is useful to
interpret information content about customer’s inventory accruals. First, suppliers gather
customer private information from the ordinary course of business (Petersen and Rajan,
1997). Suppliers pay close attention to how customers conduct service or deliver goods.
The order size and frequency could help suppliers to understand customers’ operating
conditions. The similarity in the line of business activities further empowers suppliers to
better interpret customer’s statuses and future prospects. For example, Petersen and Rajan
(1997) show that suppliers provide trade credit even to loss-making firm if the customers
have good future sales potential. Information advantage theory propose that suppliers are
8

able to interpret the information content of customer’s inventory accruals as well as predict
future demand and understand industry trends (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). Since
supplier’s information advantage likely curtail both procedural and estimation errors in
predicting future cash flows, a high level of customer’s inventory accruals might not result
in poor supplier’s earnings quality. Moreover, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue that
information advantage of suppliers is obtained from their input transaction. Distinct from
other types of lenders, suppliers automatically notify if the customer is carrying out a
productive activity. Moreover, customers’ payment activities could be directly observed
by suppliers. If customers fail to reach early payment discount option, it means they do
not have lower cost alternatives to repay the owing amount and may indicate operating
problems (Smith, 1987). To extend, imprecise future information signaled by customer’s
inventory accruals become a clear picture to the suppliers when combined with that their
existing information set. For example, a high level of customer’s inventory accruals could
be interpreted as higher future demand when the customer firm implements a productive
activity and takes advantages of early payment discounts. Thus, a high level of customer’s
inventory accruals may suggest a more sophisticated management team with good supply
chain collaboration processes and information sharing with their suppliers. Based on the
arguments above and extant empirical evidence, we hypothesize that supplier may have
an information advantage in interpreting the information of customer’s inventory accruals
and a high customer’s inventory level do not lead to lower financial reporting quality.
Given the two contrasting views, it remains an empirical question whether customer’s
inventory accruals affect supplier’s earnings quality. Thus, we establish the following
hypothesis:
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Ceteris paribus, higher level of customer’s inventory accruals level does not affect
supplier’s earnings quality.

3. Research Design
This section discusses the research designs used to test our hypothesis. To examine
whether a high level of inventory accruals at downstream customers affects a supplier
firm’s earnings quality, we consider two commonly used proxies – the standard deviation
of Dechow and Dichev (2002) residuals and the absolute magnitude of abnormal accruals
(Francis et al. 2005). To capture the propensity of earnings management, we employ the
extent of income increasing accruals.
We utilize the following model to empirically evaluate how customer inventory
accruals affects earnings quality:

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜉𝜉

(1)

where Earnings Quality is proxied by discretionary accrual and accrual quality.
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is level of customer’s inventory accruals. We control for other determinants of
reporting quality and earnings management, described in more detail later.

The first measure of earnings quality is based on the method developed by Dechow
and Dichev (2002) and modified by Francis et al. (2005). The rationale of this approach
is to map accruals into past, present and future operating cash flows and measurement
error weakens such mapping. With this premise, the standard deviation of this
measurement error (AQ) represents deteriorating earnings quality in which higher AQ
10

indicates poorer earnings quality. According to Dechow and Dichev (2002), we model the
measurement error in earnings with the following regression:

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

where WA represents working capital accruals, CFO is the cash flows from operations,
ΔREV is the change in total revenue, and PPE is property, plant and equipment (gross).
AQ is measured by the standard deviation of residuals, calculated over years t-4 through
t. 1 All variables are deflated by average total assets and winsorized at the 1% level to
mitigate the effect of extreme values.
Our second proxy of earnings quality is measured by the absolute value of
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) which is derived from the modified Jones (1991) model.
The measure is based on the rationale that a firm’s accruals capture both fundamentals
like changes in revenues and PPE. Thus, the amount that cannot be explained by
fundamentals can be viewed as abnormal, and high level of abnormal accruals implies low
earnings quality. To define the level of abnormal accruals, we employ the following model
by industry-year with at least 20 firm-years in year t. 2

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1 (𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3)

Accrual quality is the standard deviation of the residuals (𝜀𝜀) over current and past 4 years with at least 4
observations out of 5 years.
2
Industries are defined per Fama and French (1997).
1
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Total accruals (TA) represents income before extraordinary items less net operating cash
flows, ΔAR is change in accounts receivable and the remaining variables are defined as
equation 2. All variables are deflated by average total assets and winsorized at the 1%
level to mitigate the effect of extreme values. The absolute value of the residual (𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) is

our second proxy of earnings quality. To ensure consistency of interpretation for AQ and
ABS_DA, higher AQ and ABS_DA imply poorer financial reporting quality.

To measure earnings quality, we utilize the error term 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in equation (3) that

indicates deviations from expected accruals explained by fundamental operating activities

of the supplier. In short, the error term captures the extent of accrual manipulation. In
addition, we consider only positive errors (labeled as DA> 0), as we are intended to find
out whether managers exploit income-increasing discretionary accruals to attain financial
reporting objectives.
In estimating equation (1), we control for several determinants of earnings quality
and earnings management following Jiang et al. (2010) and Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006). In particular, we control for supplier’s firm characteristics like firm size (Size),
firm leverage (LEV), age of the firm (OldFirm), growth opportunities proxied by market
to book ratio (MB), volatility in operations proxied by volatility of sales growth
(StdSaleGrwth). Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that earnings quality measures are
especially sensitive to firm-specific volatility in outcome variables like sales and financial
performance. Hence, we control for standard deviation of sales (StdSale) and standard
deviation of operating cash flows (StdCF). We also include the level of supplier’s
inventory accruals (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 ) in our model. The estimated empirical specification is as
follows:
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +

𝛼𝛼5 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜉𝜉

(4)

Industry and year fixed effects are captured in the model to control for possible
differences in industries and economy-wide trends. We predict that the coefficient 𝛼𝛼1

from equation (4) will be positive (negative) if having high level of customer’s inventory
accruals is associated with poorer (better) earnings quality and more (less) earnings
management.

4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset includes supply chain pairs listed in Compustat Segment database
during the years 1977-2016. Our primary variable of interest is the customer’s inventory
accruals. Since a supplier can have multiple customers, we employ supply chain sales
weighted average to aggregate variables from customers (Patatoukas, 2012). We calculate
the weighted customers’ inventory accruals (𝑤𝑤_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ) as follow:
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑛𝑛

𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
∑𝑗𝑗=1 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑤𝑤_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1

where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is supply chain sales from supplier i to customer j; n is the number of

customers in year t; and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is inventory accruals of customer j in year t.
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Following prior studies, we exclude the customer firms from financial industry (i.e. sic
code 6000 – 6999).
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables utilized in the empirical
specifications (Appendix 1 reports detailed variable definitions). Although our dataset is
extracted from Compustat Segment database which is different from prior literature, the
mean and median of the earnings quality proxies do not deviate very much from those in
prior literature (e.g. Hopkins et al., 2015).
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix which reveals interesting clues about the
relation between customer’s inventory accruals (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ) and earnings quality proxies.
First, w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is positively correlated with both AQ and ABS_DA, suggesting that
suppliers with high level of customers’ inventory accruals experience lower earnings

quality (i.e., higher AQ and ABS_DA). Second, w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is positively correlated with

Positive_DA implying that firms with high level of customers’ inventory accruals may
have greater tendency to manage earnings upwards to attain earnings targets, an indication
of intentional estimation error.
Although these results suggest a higher level of customers’ inventory accruals
leads to suppliers’ lower earnings quality and more earnings management, our dependent
variable w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is correlated with fundamental characteristics like size (SIZE) and

age (OldFirm). Thus, we turn next to the multivariate analysis.
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5. Empirical Findings
5.1. Main Results
Table 3 demonstrates the empirical results for the relationship between the
weighted customers’ inventory accruals (w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ) and our measures of earnings

quality. Column (1) shows the findings of assessing equation (4) utilizing AQ as the proxy
for earnings quality. The coefficient on w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is positive and significant (𝛼𝛼1 =
0.033, p < 0.01), implying that firms with a higher level of customers’ inventory accruals

have lower accrual quality. In column (2) we find consistent results in which
w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is positively related to higher absolute discretionary accruals (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.053,

p < 0.01). The results are appealing to the errors in accrual estimation hypothesis. The
evidence does not support that supplier have information advantage to interpret
customer’s inventory information. In economic terms, these results suggest that when the
level of customer’s inventory accruals is increased by 1 unit, AQ and ABS_DA is
approximately increased by 52% and 82% respectively, measured at the median of the
distribution of these variables. 3 Results presented in column (3) test the association of
customer’s inventory accruals on their firms’ earnings management practices. The
coefficient of w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is positive but insignificant. The results are similar to
preliminary findings of the univariate correlations in Table 1.

Since supplier may not incorporate the customer inventory information into the
financial reporting practice in the same fiscal year, we re-examine model (1) – (3) using

In Table 1, the median of AQ is 0.063. The coefficient on the customer inventory accruals (w_INVACCc)
in Table 3 is 0.033. When w_abi is increased by 0.01 unit, there is a 0.52% increase in AQ [(0.033/0.063)
* 0.01]. For ABS_DA, the median is 0.065. The coefficient on the customer inventory accruals in Table 3
is 0.053, representing a 0.82% increase [(0.053/0.065) * 0.01].
3
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one-year lead dependent variables. Results in column (4) – (5) are generally consistent
with previous findings. The coefficient of w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 in column (6) becomes

statistically significant (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.069, p < 0.01). Supplier with a higher level of customers’

inventory accruals is associated with higher level of income-increasing discretionary
accruals in year t+1. As with the tests on earnings quality of supplier, the result is
consistent with errors in accruals hypothesis.

5.2 Robustness Tests
In this section, we investigate if the results reported in Table 3 are robust to
alternative design choices. Even though we control for related firm characteristics that
determine earnings quality, there yet may be characteristics that we have omitted. Further,
the customer’s inventory accruals could be endogenously determined. We address each of
these issues in turn.

5.2.1 Changes in the level customer’s inventory accruals
First, we address the issue of omitted variables by conducting an analysis using
changes specification. Specifically, we only retain observations in which the level of
customers’ inventory accruals changes (increasing inventory accruals or decreasing
inventory accruals between time t and time t+1) and re-estimate equation (4) using change
specification. Thus, the firm acts as its own control, and the coefficient of change in
weighted customers’ inventory accruals (ch_ w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ) captures the change in

supplier’s earnings quality due to the change in customer’s inventory accruals. Results
reported in Table 4 are generally consistent with previous findings. The coefficient of
ch_w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 in the ch_ABS_DA regression is positively significant (𝛼𝛼1 = 0.069,
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p<0.1). The coefficient of ch_w_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 in the ch_AQ regression is also positive and
significant.

5.2.2 Instrumental Variables
Since having customer with different level of inventory accruals might be a choice
variable, endogeneity is a potential concern. To solve the problem, we conduct an
instrumental variables approach (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). We use customer’s
operational efficiency, measured by industry-adjusted inventory turnover, as the
instrumental variable. It has two important features as an instrument. First, Lee and
Kesavan (2018) find that it is correlated with our variable of interest (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ), as firms

with higher operational efficiency have a lower probability of inventory buildup. Second,
it is unlikely that the operations management of the downstream customer affects the
accounting practices of the supplier firm. Hence, it exhibits appealing properties of a valid
instrument: exogeneity and a strong correlation with the variables of interest.
To implement the instrumental variables approach, we estimate the first-stage
OLS regression as follow:

𝑤𝑤_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼5 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +

𝛼𝛼9 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5)
where 𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the supply chain sales weighted inventory turnovers.
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Inventory needs in different industries can be quite different. Accordingly, we
follow Chen et al. (2005,2007) and Hutton et al. (2012) to take the normalized deviation
from the industry mean to define whether a firm has superior operational efficiency or
fall behind. To illustrate, it is the normalized cost of goods sold to inventory ratio (i.e. [IT
– industry mean of IT]/ industry standard deviation of IT). The remaining variables is
defined as previous equations.
An advantage of using 𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is unit free. The interpretation of 𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is simple.

If 𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is positive, customers of firm i in year t are more efficient than their competitors
in the same industry on average, and vice versa.

Using the predicted values from equation (5), we estimate the following
specification:

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑤𝑤_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +

𝛼𝛼3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ_𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 +
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(6)

The variable of interest (𝑤𝑤_ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] ) is the predicted value from

equation (5) and represents the exogenous portion of customers’ inventory accruals.

Table 5 tabulates the results of the instrumental variables tests. We expect the
exogenous instrument, w_ait, loads negatively in the first stage, indicating that the level
of customers’ inventory accruals is decreasing with their operational efficiency. Results
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of the second-stage estimation presented in columns (2) indicate that inferences are
consistent with those drawn from Table 3.

5.3 Alternative Proxy for Customer’s Inventory Accruals
Since the inventory valuation method can be different across companies, we adjust the
inventory number by including the change of last-in-first-out reserve (lifr) in our
inventory accruals measure.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

Δinvt 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + Δlifr𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Consistent with previous practices, we aggregate the variables from customers (including
AINVACCc) using supply chain sales weighted average when suppliers have multiple
customers.
Table 6 examine the relation between adjusted inventory accruals (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 ) of

customer and proxies of supplier’s earnings quality. The results show that suppliers with
higher AINVACC tend to have lower earnings quality. The coefficients on AINVACC are
positive and significant (coefficient = 0.027 and 0.048 and p-value <0.05, <0.01
respectively) when explaining future AQ and ABS_DA. The coefficient of 𝑤𝑤_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐

for Positive_DA becomes significant when explaining future Positive_DA at t+1. These
results are generally consistent with previous findings and support the errors in accrual
estimation hypothesis rather than informational advantage hypothesis.
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5.4 Summary
Overall, these tests establish a significant negative causal relation between
customer’s inventory accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality. When customers
firms accumulate a high level of inventory accruals, suppliers face more difficulty in
earnings estimation and tend to engage in upwards earnings management. Our inferences
are robust to change specifications and different measures of customer’s inventory
accruals. Moreover, our robust instrumental variable (IV) analysis proposes a causal
interpretation of the impact of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s earnings
quality instead of a reverse relation.

6. Additional Analyses
6.1. Does the Customer’s Inventory Accruals increase the Likelihood of Misstatements?
The findings thus far suggest there is a negative causal relation between
customer’s inventory accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality. Now, we investigate
the impact of customer’s inventory accruals level on the likelihood of misstatements of
supplier firms. Many accounting researchers use restatements, SEC Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and internal control weakness reported under
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as the external indicators of earnings misstatements, either
for unintentional errors or intentional earnings management. Disadvantages of using
AAERs include selection bias and small sample sizes. Meanwhile, there are problems
with differentiating between intentional and unintentional errors using restatements and
SOX firms sample. Thus, Dechow et al. (2011) demonstrate that financial statement
information is useful for detecting earnings management and introduce a composite
20

measure of the probability of manipulation (F-score) to detect the likelihood of financial
misstatements. To elaborate, F-Score (fscore) is a scaled logistic probability measure that
utilize the characteristics of misstatements firms such as accrual quality, financial
performance, off-balance sheet information, nonfinancial measures, and market-based
measures to predict future misstatements. If suppliers with high level of customers’
inventory accruals have a higher propensity to misstate their financial statements, these
firms result in higher fscore.
Table 7 column (1) presents the results of relation between the level of customers’
inventory accruals (w_INVACCc) and suppliers’ F-Score. The coefficient on w_INVACCc
is positively significant (coefficient = 0.97 and p<0.01). This indicates a higher level of
customers’ inventory accruals increases the probability of misstatements of supplier firms.
Column (2) is the results of the estimation of the tendency of suppliers reporting internal
control weakness (ICW) in year t or t+1. The sample period is from 2004 to 2016 for
column (2) analysis since the SOX 404 became effective in 2004. Due to the sample
period restriction, the number of observations is reduced to 6,153. The coefficient on
w_INVACCc is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 3.98, p<0.05). It implies
that suppliers with higher level of customer’s inventory accruals tend to report material
weakness in current or next year.

6.2 Does Supplier’s Inventory Accruals Influence their Earnings Quality?
Our inference that inventory accruals engender inferior financial reporting quality
and greater earnings management is predicated on the potential errors inherent in
estimating inventory accruals. Extant research (Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Allen et al.,
2013) document that inventory accruals lead to lower persistence of earnings. Therefore,
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it is not inconceivable that supplier’s own inventory accruals, instead of customer’s
inventory accruals, affects the incidence and magnitude of earnings estimation errors,
thereby resulting in lower earnings quality.
To test this conjecture, we compare and correlate the customer’s inventory
accruals and supplier’s own inventory changes.
Table 2 reports the correlations between general supplier’s own (INVACCs) and
their customer’s inventory accruals (INVACCc). The correlations indicate that supplier’s
inventory accruals are highly correlated with those of their customer (corr = 0.17, p<0.01).
This suggests that (i) the role of inventory accruals for earnings quality documented is
likely to propagate along the supply chain, (ii) the impact of customer’s inventory accruals
on their supplier’s earnings quality could be explained by the supplier’s own inventory
accrual level.
Table 8 tabulates results from regression results of the relationship between the
firm’s own inventory accruals and reporting outcomes. In estimating the regressions, we
estimate equation (4) by adding the control variable for the firm’s inventory accruals
(INVACCs), customer concentration (rank_cc), average supply chain relationship
duration (avg_duration) and operating cycle (operating_cycle). Results are broadly
consistent with both the firm’s and their customer’s inventory accruals affect earnings
quality. Our findings indicate that the effects of customer’s inventory accruals are
incrementally significant on supplier’s earnings quality after controlling for the supplier’s
own inventory accruals. We also find that the firm’s own inventory accruals level is
positively associated with its absolute value of discretionary accruals (coefficient =
0.0056) and accruals quality (coefficient = 0.029) and the coefficient in the earnings
quality regression does not reach conventional significance levels. With respect to
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likelihood of accounting misstatements, we document that the firm’s own inventory level
is positively related to the F-Score and the relationship is statistically strong. Together,
the evidence suggests that customer’s inventory accruals is an external determinant of the
supplier’s earnings quality which is incremental to the firm’s own inventory accruals
documented.

6. Conclusions
This paper examines how the level of customer’s inventory accruals affects
supplier’s financial reporting, specifically the role they play in firms’ accounting quality
and earnings management. We consider two contrasting hypotheses towards the effects
of customer’s inventory accruals on supplier’s earnings quality. First, we consider a high
level of customer’s inventory accruals allows international and unintentional errors in
earnings estimation to occur and there is a neagtive relation between customer’s inventory
accruals level and supplier’s earnings quality. Second, we consider supplier may have
inherent informational advantages when processing the customer inventory information.
Based on informational advantage hypothesis, customer’s inventory accruals level is
unrelated to supplier’s earnings quality. Our findings indicate that customer’s inventory
accruals level is negatively associated with supplier’s earnings quality. In additional tests,
we employ alternative measures to capture the differences in inventory recording methods
and the results are consistent to the main analysis.
Taken as a whole, the results are not favor with supplier’s information advantage
hypothesis, at least with respect to accounting quality and earnings management decisions.
Rather, high level of customer’s inventory accruals adversely affects supplier’s financial
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reporting quality. Our results are robust to change base analysis using the observations
with changing inventory holding practices and adding change specifications to the model.
Moreover, we also use different indicators of earnings quality including F-Score (Dechow
et al., 2011) and internal control weakness. Furthermore, our results are robust when
additional control variables such as supplier’s own inventory accruals, customer
concentration, average supply chain relationship duration and operating cycle are included.
All the findings are broadly consistent with our main results which support the errors in
accrual estimation hypothesis.
Our paper contributes to the literature about inventory accruals externality along
the supply chain and the determinates of earnings quality. To our knowledge, we are
among the first to address the adverse effect of customer’s inventory accruals level on
their supplier’s earnings quality and likelihood of financial misstatements. Second, we
shed light on how customer’s inventory accruals level extends to other aspects to stock
market reaction, in this case, accounting practices. Third, our evidence has important
implications to the investing community. If customer’s inventory accruals level affects
supplier firms’ earnings quality, our evidences are useful to capital market participants in
distinguishing between reliable earnings information and inaccurate earnings information.
Specifically, this study extends and develops the understanding on the influence of
inventory accruals on earnings quality along the supply chain.
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Appendix 1
Variable Definitions
Variable
w_INVACCc
AQ
ABS_DA
Positive_DA
SIZE
LEV
MB
StdSaleGrwth
StdSale
StdCF
OldFirm
fscore
ICW
avg_duration
rank_cc

ABIs
w_ait

AINVACCc

Variable Definition
customer’s supply chain sales weighted inventory accruals; inventory
accruals is defined as change in inventory for year t-1 to year t deflated
by average total assets;
accruals quality estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals of a
modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) over the current and previous 4 years;
absolute value of discretionary accruals from a modified Jones (1991)
model;
positive discretionary accruals from a modified Jones (1991) model, 0
or negative discretionary are considered as missing value
log of market value of equity;
total long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at);
market to book equity ratio;
standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous 4
years;
standard deviation of sales over the current and previous 4 years;
standard deviation of cash flows from operations (oancf) scaled by total
assets (at) over the current and previous 4 years;
Indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm is listed on Compustat for
more than 20 years, equals to 0 otherwise;
F-Score developed by Dechow et al. (2011)
= 1 when the firm reports internal control weakness at year t or year
t+1
average duration of supplier-customer relationship in Compustat
Segment database;
𝑗𝑗

decile rank of customer concentration (cc), 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑗𝑗=1(

𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2
) ,
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the supply chain sales from customer j to supplier i at
time t;
inventory accruals of supplier which is calculated as change of
inventory from year t-1 to year t deflated by average total assets
customer’s supply chain sales weighted abnormal inventory turnover;
abnormal inventory turnover is defined as [(IT – industry mean of IT)/
industry standard deviation of IT] where IT is inventory turnover (cost
of goods sold to inventory ratio)
customer’s supply chain sales weighted adjusted inventory accruals;
adjusted inventory accruals is defined as [(Δinvt +Δlifr) / average total
asset], where Δinvt is change of inventory and Δlifr is change in last-infirst-out reserve of inventory from year t-1 to year t
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics and correlations for 9,768 firm-years. All variables are
defined in Appendix 1
w_INVACCc
ABS_DA
Positive_DA
AQ
fscore
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
ABIs
OldFirm
rank_cc
avg_duration

count

mean

p50

sd

p25

p75

9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768
9768

.0115957
.0645361
.0643658
.0627237
1.087922
4.856391
.172336
2.943373
.2285443
158.6124
.0921718
.0263468
.3516585
.5321663
4.820265

.0047459
.0422383
.0422383
.0462406
.9250701
4.793318
.1225799
1.697309
.1604383
22.51129
.0622938
.0085103
0
.5
4

.0319648
.071992
.0710306
.0542824
.7821753
2.304314
.1827923
4.47993
.2344034
435.6631
.1036413
.0582517
.4775124
.2824285
4.098264

-.0020232
.0177203
.0177203
.0276799
.5207914
3.139072
.0026362
1.016719
.0842229
6.006624
.0364486
0
0
.3
2

.0196538
.0836792
.0836792
.077507
1.416282
6.496804
.286606
3.057346
.2822674
91.65877
.1066742
.043592
1
.8
6
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix
w_INVACCc
w_INVACCc
1
ABS_DA
0.0557***
Positive_DA
0.0556***
AQ
0.00928
fscore
0.128***
SIZE
-0.0450***
LEV
-0.00556
MB
0.00442
sd of sales gr~h
0.0187*
sd of sales
-0.0444***
sd of cash flow
-0.0103
ABIs
0.170***
OldFirm
-0.0201**

ABS_DA
1
0.999***
0.480***
0.412***
-0.285***
-0.0834***
0.154***
0.319***
-0.122***
0.357***
0.357***
-0.122***

Positiv~A

1
0.478***
0.412***
-0.287***
-0.0838***
0.151***
0.319***
-0.123***
0.355***
0.361***
-0.123***

AQ

fscore

1
0.233***
1
-0.286*** -0.0625***
-0.165*** 0.000452
0.248***
0.0845***
0.478***
0.231***
-0.131*** -0.0185*
0.563***
0.0950***
0.101***
0.491***
-0.170*** -0.0669***

SIZE

LEV

1
0.170***
0.156***
-0.320***
0.518***
-0.297***
-0.0858***
0.202***

1
0.0519***
-0.150***
0.120***
-0.184***
0.0332***
0.0306***

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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MB

1
0.0920***
0.0142
0.301***
0.0129
-0.0925***

sd of s~h

1
-0.0210**
0.395***
0.0948***
-0.126***

sd of s~s

1
-0.152***
-0.0518***
0.121***

sd of c~w

1
0.0603***
-0.192***

ABIs

1
-0.0783***

OldFirm

1

Table 3 Relation between Customer’s Weighted Invetory Accruals and Proxies of
Earnings Quality
This table reports OLS estimation of the association between customer’s supply chain
weighted average abnormal inventory (w_ABIc) and proxies of earnings quality and
reporting quality over the period 1977–2016. Models (1) – (3) are estimated using
variables at fiscal year t, whereas we use one year ahead dependent variable in models (4)
– (6). All variables are defined in the appendix. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses. 4
AQ
b/se
w_INVACCc
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
OldFirm
ABIs
N
r2_a
Cluster
Segment_dummies
Year_dummies

ABS_DA
b/se

Positive_DA
b/se

AQ[t+1]
b/se

ABS_DA[t+1]
b/se

Positive_~1]
b/se

.0331967***
(.0104288)
-.0034588***
(.0003267)
-.0015067
(.0026469)
.0010957***
(.0001352)
.0579882***
(.0046354)
5.10e-07
(7.18e-07)
.1907574***
(.0097546)
-.0018451*
(.0009795)
.003387
(.006531)

.0527304***
(.0165276)
-.0052867***
(.0003587)
-.0090499***
(.0026988)
.0013533***
(.0001903)
.0496265***
(.0042697)
3.73e-06***
(8.93e-07)
.1344606***
(.0133687)
-.0020208
(.0012473)
.0217182
(.0189)

.0106511
(.0213329)
-.0055986***
(.0004168)
-.0017796
(.0034985)
.0013933***
(.0002376)
.0402068***
(.0053324)
2.78e-06**
(1.28e-06)
.1329247***
(.0134771)
.0012746
(.0011897)
.410311***
(.0209245)

.0447887***
(.0120411)
-.003636***
(.000366)
-.0054222*
(.0027043)
.0012666***
(.0001538)
.056988***
(.0047239)
1.15e-06
(8.40e-07)
.1804318***
(.010282)
-.0017426
(.0010537)
-.0093522
(.0060591)

.0419721*
(.0213075)
-.0065591***
(.0004492)
-.015824***
(.0039928)
.0016011***
(.0002476)
.0430866***
(.004867)
4.40e-06***
(1.11e-06)
.083985***
(.0135021)
-.0028687*
(.0016105)
.0445234***
(.0151683)

.0691075***
(.0211716)
-.0061873***
(.000527)
-.0250398***
(.0050192)
.0021369***
(.0003532)
.0391995***
(.0058625)
2.29e-06
(1.61e-06)
.0783931***
(.0133229)
-.0004299
(.0014782)
.0631731***
(.0232707)

22706
.4455527
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

22921
.193784
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

11303
.3106762
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

17274
.4389906
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

17335
.1684687
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

8459
.1904804
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

For the models in column (4) – (6), we only keep the observations in which the firm maintain supply
chain relationship in both fiscal year t and year t+1.
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Table 4 Relation between Changes of Customer’s Weighted Abnormal Inventory
and Proxies of Earnings Quality
This table reports estimation of the relation between changes of customer weighted abnormal
inventory and changes of proxies of earnings quality over the period 1977-2016. All variables
are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
ch_ABS_DA
b/se
ch_w_INVACCc
ch_SIZE
ch_LEV
ch_MB
ch_StdSaleGrwth
ch_StdSale
ch_StdCF
ch_OldFirm
ch_ABIs
N
r2_a
Cluster
Segment_dummies
Year_dummies

ch_AQ
b/se

.0609049*
(.034136)
-.0058758**
(.0026951)
.0040789
(.0086586)
.0028949***
(.0007372)
.0116868
(.0163553)
3.33e-06
(4.59e-06)
.1442697***
(.0379599)
.0057442
(.003993)
-.0529526*
(.0296862)

.0195961*
(.0114731)
-.0005391
(.0010066)
.0040368
(.0032756)
.0007152**
(.000265)
.0362875***
(.0051779)
-1.53e-06
(1.08e-06)
.1617302***
(.0137945)
.002471
(.0019605)
-.0295873***
(.0081595)

4811
.0205285
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

4798
.1449969
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

31

Table 5 IV
We use operational efficiency of customer (i.e. supply chain sales weighted industry
adjusted inventory turnover) as an instrumental variable for customer abnormal
inventory.
first stag~)
b/se
w_ait
w_INVACCc
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
OldFirm
ABIs
constant
N
r2_a
Cluster
Segment_dummies
Year_dummies

-.0124946***
(.0011877)
.0003057
(.0002025)
-.0030821*
(.0016482)
.0001696**
(.0000673)
.0028646*
(.0016616)
-8.04e-07
(5.55e-07)
-.0112016***
(.0033088)
.0003331
(.000644)
.0409787***
(.0077786)
.0093501***
(.0012584)
22842
.0991496
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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IV(ABS_DA)
b/se

.2682826**
(.1288431)
-.0053058***
(.0003662)
-.0081626***
(.002816)
.001312***
(.0001969)
.0495995***
(.0043939)
3.86e-06***
(9.68e-07)
.1362975***
(.0133251)
-.0019125
(.0012419)
.0147623
(.0204462)

22395
.1849137
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

Table 6 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Proxies of Earnings Quality
(Using an Alternate Proxy for Abnormal inventory
Results of OLS estimation of the relation between alternative metrics and proxies of earnings
quality. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

Adjusted Inventory Accrual (AABIc)
AQ

b/se
main

w_ABIc
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
OldFirm
ABIs

N

r2_a

Cluster

Segment_dummies

Year_dummies

.0269868**

ABS_DA
b/se

.0475483***

Positive_DA
b/se

.0084236

fscore
b/se

.8173253***

ICW

b/se

2.26027

(.0105367)

(.016808)

(.0221461)

(.2197477)

(1.700942)

(.0003493)

(.0003912)

(.0004454)

(.0046316)

(.0646841)

(.0027873)

(.0030694)

(.0041233)

(.0512286)

(.3593054)

(.0001384)

(.0002007)

(.0002545)

(.0020154)

(.0094092)

(.0048062)

(.0045877)

(.0056815)

(.0432547)

(.3581138)

(8.15e-07)

(1.05e-06)

(1.44e-06)

(.0000186)

(.000152)

(.0102295)

(.014886)

(.0156691)

(.0882245)

(.5711907)

(.0010515)

(.0013386)

(.0013106)

(.0163508)

(.1939758)

(.0070705)

(.0202662)

(.0227148)

(.1864922)

(1.44165)

17806

5253

-.0035346***

-.0011587

.0011396***

.0597333***
7.37e-07

.1934512***

-.0018825*
.0072133

19977

.4457374

-.0053568***

-.0091044***
.0013778***

.0518248***
4.17e-06***

.1364635***

-.0021446
.0187566

20151

.1920991

-.0055545***

-.0028273

.0013765***

.0413537***
2.74e-06*

.1346958***
.0010984

.4117754***

9893

.3064132

.0137032***

.2871451***
.0024908

.3902175***
6.37e-06

-.0298734

.0353714**

4.696057***

.2648558

-.279462***

.9781354***

-.0040328
.6578839*
4.73e-06
.53729

-.0464677
.2551008

.

Firm, year

Firm, year

Firm, year

Firm, year

Firm, year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Yes

Yes

No

Table 7 Relation between Abnormal inventory and Earnings Quality (F-score and
ICW)
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
fscore
b/se
main
w_INVACCc
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
OldFirm
ABIs
N
r2_a
Cluster
Segment_dummies
Year_dummies

ICW
b/se

.9714677***
(.2036407)
.0170669***
(.0046464)
.3082972***
(.0479931)
.0025857
(.0020518)
.4183584***
(.0430695)
3.03e-06
(.000017)
-.0638847
(.0790948)
.035513**
(.0150913)
4.70076***
(.1716032)

3.980367**
(1.865841)
-.2955507***
(.0593769)
.7854664**
(.3783774)
-.0022784
(.0089555)
.5834658*
(.3530876)
.0000594
(.0001385)
.5659792
(.5448921)
-.0685489
(.1702283)
.4167528
(1.228417)

20206
.2642451
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

6153
.
Firm, year
No
No

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8 Additional Control Variables

AQ
b/se
main
w_INVACCc
SIZE
LEV
MB
sd of sales growth
sd of sales
sd of cash flow
OldFirm
ABIs
rank_cc
avg_duration
operating_cycle
N
r2_a
Cluster
Segment_dummies
Year_dummies

ABS_DA
b/se

fscore
b/se

ICW
b/se

.0230095**
(.0109645)
-.0031589***
(.0003174)
-.0004935
(.0028647)
.001016***
(.0001448)
.061683***
(.0045119)
9.11e-07
(7.63e-07)
.2000213***
(.0100436)
-.001317
(.0009886)
.0047915
(.006064)
.0028441
(.0017553)
-.0003196**
(.0001212)
.0096686***
(.0010692)

.0418633**
(.0163672)
-.0044687***
(.0003799)
-.0081933***
(.0028486)
.0012215***
(.0001834)
.0544287***
(.0041269)
4.12e-06***
(9.23e-07)
.1482494***
(.0151601)
-.0017098
(.001252)
.0237332
(.0182515)
.0064288***
(.0023051)
-.0001247
(.0001317)
.0163768***
(.0014514)

.7305971***
(.2070916)
.0132725***
(.0048722)
.3503609***
(.0513038)
.0012183
(.0024674)
.4151371***
(.0409972)
4.91e-06
(.000017)
-.0241019
(.0913979)
-.0028208
(.0145964)
4.706869***
(.1608205)
-.0814632***
(.0264479)
.0067691***
(.0020641)
.2006007***
(.0154239)

3.58018*
(1.898461)
-.2914286***
(.0587439)
.8480452*
(.4330578)
-.0108666
(.0116494)
.3617812
(.3970299)
.0000804
(.0001371)
1.551529***
(.5932976)
-.2028876
(.1756445)
.249356
(1.110245)
.1865255
(.211775)
.0193833
(.0152725)
.1613136
(.1000582)

19977
.4681747
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

20188
.211842
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

17727
.2952408
Firm, year
Yes
Yes

5247
.
Firm, year
No
No

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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